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III. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING BELOW 
The Plaintiffs below and appellees here, Lawrence M. Russell; 
Russell/Packard Development, Inc.; Saratoga Springs Development, L.C.; Merlin Smith 
and Margie Smith, filed a motion for summary disposition pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated §38-9-7 requesting the Court below to nullify the Notice of Interest filed by 
Petitioners and Appellants as a wrongful lien pursuant to said statute. The Appellants, 
John J. Thomas and PRP Development, L.C., objected to the request, requested a hearing 
and at the hearing the Court summarily, pursuant to §38-9-7 nullified and terminated the 
Notice of Interest filed by the Appellant. The District Court ruled from the bench, after 
oral argument, on the 4th day of August, 1998. The order was entered on the 14th day of 
August, 1998. 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to §78-2-2(3)(j) 
Utah Code Ann. (1953) as amended, because the appeal is from a final order of the 
District Court, a court of record over which the Court of Appeals does not have original 
appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has transferred this matter to the Court of 
Appeals pursuant to Subsection (4) of the above-referenced Statute. 
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IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether or not a Notice of Interest as authorized by Utah Code Annotated § 57-9-4 
is a wrongful lien within the meaning of Utah Code Annotated §38-9-7 as ftirther defined 
in §38-9-1(6) which states as follows: 
" "Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create 
a lien or encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real 
property and at the time it is recorded or filed is not: 
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another 
state or federal statute; 
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or 
judgment or a court of competent jurisdiction in 
the state; or 
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a 
document signed by the owner of the real 
property." 
Because the proceeding upon which Petitioner went forth in the above-entitled matter is 
a summary proceeding, the standard for appellate review is that of "correction of error" 
and no deference is to be given to the trial Court's legal conclusions. Bonham v. Morgan, 
788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989) ("Inasmuch as a challenge to summary judgment presents 
for review conclusions of law only, because, by definition, summary judgments do not 
resolve factual issues, this Court reviews those conclusions for correctness, without 
according deference to the trial court's legal conclusions"). (Ibid) The standard of appellate 
review then is that the appellate court must determine whether the trial court properly 
found that a Notice of Interest filed pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §57-9-4 and §57-9-5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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is a wrongful lien subject to summary relief within the meaning of Utah Code Annotated 
§38-9-7. 
V. 
RULE 
None 
VI. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated §38-9-7, Utah Code Annotated §38-9-1(6), Utah Code 
Annotated §57-9-4 and 57-9-5. 
VII. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiffs/Appellees filed their petition requesting immediate summary 
relief pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §38-9-7 arguing that the Claimants Notice of 
Interest was a wrongful lien. (Transcript P. 5; Appendices 1) (ROA at - .) The 
Appellants requested a hearing on the claims of the Plaintiff. At me hearing, upon 
presentation of the evidence by Petitioner/Appellee, Defendant/Appellant argued that the 
Notice of Interest was not a wrongful lien as required by Utah Code Annotated §38-9-1 
in that a Notice of Interest was not a lien or encumbrance upon property and that Utah 
Code Annotated § 57-9-4 expressly authorized the Notice of Interest. The Notice of 
Interest was based upon a contract entered into by the parties which provided that 
8 
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Appellants were entitled to a trust deed upon the property in question upon closing of a 
construction loan to be granted from Appellees. (Transcript P. 4-5; Appendices 2) The 
Plaintiff/Appellee admitted in his moving papers that he had not provided the trust deed 
as required by the contract. 
VIII. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
The Appellants and Appellees entered into a Purchase and Development Agreement 
dated April 2, 1997 which provided for payment to PRP of approximately $528,000 to be 
paid with closings from 66 lots located in the Saratoga Springs Subdivision Phase I, located 
in Utah County, State of Utah. (Transcript P. 4-5; Appendices 2) (See Memorandum in 
Support of Petition to Clear Title filed by the Plaintiff) The Purchase and Development 
Agreement provided at paragraph 2c that the amounts owed PRP were to be secured by trust 
deeds and trust deed notes to be recorded after the closing of the construction loan with 
American Legal Title. (Ibid) 
The trust deeds and trust deed notes were never executed by the Appellee, nor were 
they recorded. (See Transcript P. 5) The Appellants recorded a Notice of Interest on the 22nd 
day of June, 1998, referring to the Purchase and Development Agreement, that it was entitled 
to a trust deed, upon the lots. (See Plaintiffs Petition and Appendices No. 3). 
The Plaintiff/Appellee filed its Petition pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §38-9-7 to 
nullify the Notice of Interest as a wrongful lien within the meaning of that statute. The Court 
9 
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at the hearing determined that a Notice of Interest is an encumbrance upon title, was not 
otherwise authorized by statute and that it was a wrongful lien within the definition of § 38-
9-1, Utah Code Annotated, and ordered the lien to be nullified. (See Transcript P. 13-17). 
X. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In the bringing of an action for nullification of a wrongful lien, pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated §38-9-7, the Appellees made the assumption that the Notice of Interest was 
a wrongful lien in the sense that it was an encumbrance within the meaning of the statute and 
not otherwise expressly authorized by State or Federal statute. In fact, the law is clear that 
a Notice of Interest is not an encumbrance upon property, and in fact, even if it were an 
encumbrance upon property, is expressly authorized by Utah Code Annotated § 57-9-4. The 
Court's decision to include a Notice of Interest within the wrongful hen statute and make its 
determination available in summary proceedings, has the plain effect of making the filing of 
a Notice of Interest, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §57-9-4, a nullity. 
XI. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The trial court committed an error of law when it concluded that the 
Notice of Interest was a lien or encumbrance within the meaning of 
Utah Code Annotated §38-9-1 or that the Notice of Interest was not 
otherwise expressly authorized by State or Federal statute. 
The case is one of first impression before this Court to construe Utah Code Annotated 
§38-9-7. That statute permits a District Court to grant summary relief to nullify a lien if it 
10 
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is a wrongful lien, as defined in §38-9-1. Wrongful lien is defined in §38-9-1(6) as follows: 
" "Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create 
a lien or encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real 
property and at the time it is recorded or filed is not: 
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another 
state or federal statute; 
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or 
judgment or a court of competent jurisdiction in 
the state; or 
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a 
document signed by the owner of the real 
property." 
The matter before the Court is simple, straight forward, and direct. Did the 
legislature, by passing Utah Code Annotated §38-9-7 and §38-9-1, intend to permit 
summary disposition of a Notice of Interest which is also specifically authorized by statute? 
In the matter ofCommercial Investment Corp. v. Siggard, 936P.2ndll05, UTCtApp 
1997 the Court of Appeals construed the predecessor of §38-9-1 which is now §38-9-4 of 
Utah Code Annotated (1997). In that case the Court of Appeals upheld a jury verdict 
finding that a Notice of Interest was not groundless as required by statute. Since the Court 
of Appeals decided Commercial Investment v. Siggard, §38-9-1 was amended to that as set 
forth above. The statute, in Subsection 6(a), specifically states that a document is not a 
wrongful lien if it is expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal statute. 
Because §57-9-4 expressly provides for a Notice of Interest it cannot, under any 
circumstances, be in violation of §38-9-1. 
Furthermore, even if this Court were to use the analysis set out by the Court of Appeal 
1 1 
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in Commercial Investment Corp. Ibid the District Court did not determine that the Notice of 
Interest was groundless. In fact, the Court specifically stated in all likelihood the grounds 
for the Notice of Interest were not without merit, inasmuch as the Court directed the 
Respondent to file a lawsuit and file a Lis Pendens upon the property in question. In doing 
so the District Court has deprived the Appellant/Respondent of its right to file statutory 
Notice of Interest as set forth in the statute. 
This Court can also take direction from Commercial Investment Corp., ibid, in that 
the issue of the validity of the Notice of Interest was submitted to a Jury. In that case the 
result of a wrongful lien would have been enhanced damages. 
X. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the facts and the record, it is absolutely clear that the Notice of Interest 
filed by the Appellant/Defendant is not a wrongful lien as set out in §38-9-1(6) and 
Plaitniffj/Appellee was not entitled to a summary relief as provided in §38-9-7, Utah Code 
Annotated. As a result, the District Court's decision should be reversed. 
DATED t h i s i S a y of July, 1999. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. 
Davta^Black 
BLACK, STITH & ARGYLE 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on July 9, 1998) 
3 THE COURT: First matter for this afternoon 
4 is that of Lawrence Russell vs. John J. Thomas. 
5 MR. BLACK: I'm David Black, I'm 
6 representing the defendant, John Thomas of TRT. 
7 THE COURT: Anyone here on behalf of the 
8 plaintiff? As I've read through the file it looks 
9 like you've got a request to declare the lien that's 
10 being claimed as unlawful and asking that that be 
11 removed; is that correct? 
12 MR. BLACK: That's what we're requesting. 
13 THE COURT: Have you heard from anyone from 
14 the plaintiff with respect to this hearing today? 
15 MR. BLACK: I have not, your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: You're resisting his request? 
17 MR. RUSSELL: I am. I'll be happy to tell 
18 you why. 
19 THE COURT: We'll wait. 
20 MR. CARLSTON: Your Honor, I'm Michael 
21 Carlston, I apologize for being late. 
22 THE COURT: Mr. Carlston, we are here with 
23 respect to the request for a hearing that's been filed 
24 by you concerning your request as to the objectionable 
25 lien. Are you ready to proceed, sir? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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3 
MR. CARLSTON: Thank you. Your Honor, I 
represent the petitioner, and in this case there has 
been a cloud filed on a title, a copy of the notice of 
interest is attached to our moving papers as Exhibit 
No. 5. I have a notice of interest. The petitioners 
are either Mr. Russell and his company that's 
developing the lots where these are found, or the 
parties having interest in such lots. 
We seek a ruling based upon uncontroverted 
evidence that this filing of notice of interest is a 
wrongful lien pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 
38-9-1, and that these liens be removed. 
There is, as the Court knows, a perfectly 
appropriate procedure that can be followed if one has 
a claim of interest in property, and that would be to 
institutue a legal proceeding, and thus proceed to 
file a lis pendens. 
To give the Court a little background on the 
origin of this, the respondent was at one time in 
business with Mr. Russell and they have an independent 
agreement relating to some payments on some of these 
lots. There is a dispute concerning those payments 
that stems from the fact that the respondents did not 
pay the costs of the businesses that were formerly 
held together. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 The petition of Mr. Russell, having signed 
2 some of the guarantees in that, has been obligated to 
3 date to pay over $120,000 to settle those. So for 
4 that reason, he has not consented to the respondents 
5 filing a security interest on the lots in question. 
6 So rather than (inaudible) them filing a 
7 lawsuit and giving us a chance to do it by the 
8 statutory rules, they've just filed their notice of 
9 interest which is not an appropriate way to proceed. 
10 We are here requesting that that be eliminated and 
11 that if they do feel that they have an interest that 
12 they assert it in the appropriate way where a title 
13 company can evaluate it, let's say, and allow Mr. 
14 Russell to bond around it while the proceedings go on 
15 or not by virtue of the complaints that would be filed 
16 and the notice of lis pendens. 
17 I believe, your Honor, that the documents 
18 that are attached clearly explain and are supportive 
19 of the relief that's requested. 
20 THE COURT: Thank you. 
21 Mr. Black? 
22 MR. BLACK: Thank you, your Honor. A few 
23 more facts I think might help the Court in looking at 
24 where we're at. Originally TRT bought about 72 lots 
25 from an entity known as CNT. They bought them on a 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 uniform real estate contract that was between CNT as 
2 sellers and TRT as buyers (inaudible) my client. 
3 CNT is not a party to this action. They are 
4 the ones that actually own the property that --we 
5 purchased it from them and much of it has not been 
6 taken down. Now under that real estate contract there 
7 were take downs that were supposed to happen over a 
8 period of time. Some have happened and some haven't 
9 happened. 
10 At a certain point TRT sold or assigned an 
11 interest in the lots to Lawrence Russell, one of the 
12 petitioners here. That assignment is attached to our 
13 notice of interest, along with the real estate 
14 contract. So the two contracts of TRT as a party are 
15 both attached to the notice of interest. 
16 If the Court will take a close look at the 
17 notice of interest all it says is we have an , • 
18 interest as defined in both of those documents, the 
19 real estate contract and the purchase contract between 
20 TRT and Lawrence Russell. 
21 Now the purchase contract --in the purchase 
22 contract Russell agreed to pay TRT $528,000 in 
23 paragraph 2. In paragraph 2(c) of the purchase 
24 contract, Russell agrees to give TRT a trust deed of 
25 $8,000 each time Russell takes down one of the lots 
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under the underlying purchase contract that was 
assigned to him. 
We've asked Russell to do that, he hasn't 
done it, and simply speaking, because he hasn't done 
it, we don't know where they're at. 
Now TRT has an interest in the real estate 
contract if the underlying lots, when they are taken 
down by Mr. Russell, and that interest is on CNT, and 
they have to be the petitioner to complain about our 
notice of interest with regard to that interest. 
With regard to what's statutory and what's 
not statutory, I think counsel has misread the 
statute. 38-9-7 permits this Court to summarily void 
a lien or incumbrance -- actually, the statute doesn't 
talk about lien or incumbrance, it talks about 
wrongful liens, and then it refers back to 38-9-1 that 
talks about a definition of what a wrongful lien is. 
And under 38-9-1 a wrongful lien is first 
described as is it a lien or is it an incumbrance? I 
submit that a lien or incumbrance is not a notice of 
interest that is provided for by statute. In fact, a 
notice of interest is a statutory creature that is 
provided for by 57-9-4 where the statute specifically 
authorizes that. 
THE COURT: Let me interrupt you. If you 
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look at definition No. 2, doesn't that make your 
clients the last phrase in that paragraph, or other 
claim of interest in real property? You've got a lien 
claimant. It defines a lien claimant to be--
MR. BLACK: Are you looking at definition 
No. 2? 
THE COURT: That's right. 
MR. BLACK: Okay. 
THE COURT: Your client is a lien claimant 
by way of what's been filed here. Aren't they the "or 
other claim of interest" in real property? 
MR. BLACK: I think under that statute, if 
they have another claim of interest, they are a lien 
claimant, but that's not what the statute is focusing 
on. If you look at where they're entitled to summary 
disposition, it simply states where there's a wrongful 
lien, so you then have to go and look at what a 
wrongful lien is, and a wrongful lien is either a lien 
or an incumbrance. There is no case law in the State 
of Utah that says (inaudible) notice of interest is 
either a lien or an incumbrance. 
As a matter of fact, it's akin to a lis 
pendens. In Hansen v. Roller -- let's see if I have 
the cite here. The Utah Supreme Court specifically 
held -- that's at 550 P.2d 186 -- the Utah Supreme 
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1 Court specifically held that's just constructive 
2 notice if somebody claims an interest in the property 
3 through the litigation, that is not an incumbrance. 
4 That's the same as a notice of interest, and 
5 if the Court will look at the section--
6 MR. CARLSTON: What page in Hansen v. Roller 
7 is that? I've got the case here. 
8 MR. BLACK: It's about halfway through it, 
9 it's a fairly (inaudible) case (inaudible) that 
10 conversation. 
11 The statute says (inaudible) wrongful lien 
12 claimant as defined by, and then it refers us to lien 
13 claims, wrongful liens. Is it a lien or is it an 
14 incumbrance? 
15 I submit that if the legislature had 
16 intended that it be a notice of interest they could 
17 have said a lien, an incumbrance or a notice of 
18 interest, but they didn't say that. They said if this 
19 proceeding is entitled to a summary process, they are 
20 entitled to it if and only if it's a lien or if it's 
21 an incumbrance. 
22 Then we go onto the next step, they don't 
23 even -- even if they had complied with that aspect of 
24 the law, which they haven't -- an remember, this is an 
25 extraordinary remedy under the statute. The next step 
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is the wrongful lien has to be -- unless it's 
expressly authorized by this chapter or another state 
or federal statute. 57-9-4 is what they were talking 
about. 
This is authorized by 57-9-4 which states, 
"Any person claiming an interest in land they preserve 
and keep effective such interest by filing for a 
record during the 40 year period immediately following 
the respective date of writ of title (inaudible) the 
record title would otherwise be marked (inaudible)," 
and then it tells you how to do the notice of 
interest, which we have done. 
So even if they can argue ignoring all of 
the laws that this is a lien or an incumbrance, this 
statute that I just cited authorizes it. The next 
section, 57-9-5 sets out how you file a notice of 
interest, which we have complied with completely and 
fully. 
Now even if we hadn't complied with that, 
even if we hadn't complied with that, at subsection 
(c) -- and these are under disjunctive, (a), (b) and 
(c) are the disjunctive -- unless it's signed by or 
authorized pursuant to the document signed by the 
owners of real property. 
So the question is it's a also wrongful lien 
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if -- it could be a wrongful lien if it's not 
authorized by statute if the parties haven't signed 
it. 
We are here today because my client sold 
property to Mr. Russell, Mr. Russell agreed that he 
would put trust deeds on the property. He hasn't done 
it once, not one single time. We don't know how much 
property has been sold or how much property hasn't 
been sold, and I would -- I don't care if I have a 
notice of interest even, I would be happy to do what 
we thought the agreement said, have all (inaudible) 
title company and say you can't take this down unless 
you do what you promised to do. 
But my client secured $528,000, Mr. Russell 
agreed to put a trust deed on the property, he has 
failed to do it, and we exercised an appropriate 
statutory right. It has nothing to do with the 
summary proceeding that's before this Court today. 
Unless the Court has any questions, I'll sit down. 
THE COURT: I'll hear from you, Mr. 
Carlston. 
MR. CARLSTON: We simply disagree on the 
statutory construction of a wrongful lien. 
THE COURT: What is a wrongful lien? 
MR. CARLSTON: A wrongful lien means any 
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11 
document that purports to create a lien or incumbrance 
on an owner's interest in real property, and at the 
time it's recorded and filed, and I want to stop there 
for a minute. 
I thought I heard Mr. Black suggest that 
this wasn't a lien or an incumbrance, and I believe 
under all of the laws that I know it is a lien or 
incumbrance if it clouds or has any effect on the 
title. 
So then the --it being a lien or an 
incumbrance affecting the real property, then the 
question is is if it falls into one of the exceptions, 
that is is it expressly authorized by this chapter or 
another statute. 
Mr. Black said that --he argues that it's 
authorized by his statute and that the contract is 
then a contractual right to a deed of trust. That 
doesn't authorize the filing of the lien, that's at a 
minimum to them is a breach of contract action. 
He then argues that it's authorized by 
57-9-4 dealing with how you preserve the writ of 
title. That's not an argument that they've made in 
their papers until today, and actually (inaudible) 
concept on his head. 
It's not authorized either --he points to 
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12 
two arguments that this is not -- that a notice of 
interest is authorized, and there is no support in the 
law or in the statutes for either of these. A 
wrongful lien is one that (inaudible) authorized by an 
order or judgment of the Court. There's no such thing 
here. 
It's fascinating in hearing them say that 
this is akin to a lis pendens, and then he cites the 
Hansen vs. Roller case. The Hansen vs. Roller case 
actually says that the sole purpose -- this is at page 
190, your Honor. The sole purpose of recording a 
notice of lis pendens is to give constructive notice 
of the pendency of the proceeding. Its only 
foundation is the action filed, it has no existence 
independent of it. 
I submit, your Honor, that it is a wrongful 
lien, that we proceeded properly under the appropriate 
statute to have it removed. This is not really a 
serious setback for Mr. Thomas and PRP. If they feel 
they have an interest and they desire to assert it, 
there would be a well established procedure in this 
case to do it simply by filing a lawsuit and filing a 
lis pendens to go with it. 
The disadvantage that my client has under 
these circumstances is that -- you know, despite Mr. 
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1 Black's suggestion that they attached certain papers 
2 to the notice of interest, we are unable to ascertain 
3 and pin this down exactly as to the claim made for 
4 purposes of either evaluating it with the title 
5 company or taking other action. 
6 I believe that's what litigation does, and 
7 it's a little puzzling to me to see them use this 
8 action rather than go through the front door. We're 
9 just asking them to go through the front door, we're 
10 not asking them to abandon any claims they may have. 
11 This isn't the appropriate place or time to decide the 
12 merits of what Mr. Russell says the situation is 
13 versus what Mr. Thomas says it is. We acknowledge 
14 that and (inaudible) to see that happen in a more 
15 appropriate setting. 
16 We would respectfully request that the Court 
17 cause the notice of interest to be discharged under 
18 the applicable statutory position. 
19 THE COURT: Thank you. The material found 
20 in the file and the arguments that counsel have 
21 presented, Mr. Carlston I ask that you prepare the 
22 order. 
23 This Court is going to find that the notice 
24 of interest that has been filed is an incumbrance on 
25 the property, therefore subject to the petition that's 
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been filed and the plaintiff is entitled to the relief 
as requested. 
If there is a problem with respect to Mr. 
Black's client's interest in the land, the subject of 
the notice of interest, you have a remedy of pursuing 
things by way of litigation of a breach of contract 
action or whatever that may be with those folks, but I 
don't think that the request that the plaintiff has 
made is inappropriate based upon the statute as I read 
it, and I find that it's an incumbrance on the 
property. 
MR. BLACK: Is the Court finding that this 
is not otherwise authorized by statute as set out in 
subparagraph (inaudible)? 
THE COURT: Correct. 57-9-4 sets forth a 
procedure whereby a notice of lien may be filed --a 
notice of interest may be filed. It sets forth a 
process for which it can be established, but I don't 
find that it is an exception to that which you argue 
here today. 
MR. BLACK: Your Honor, could I--
THE COURT: And I would like that in the 
finding as well. 
MR. BLACK: I appreciate that. Your Honor, 
may I make a motion to stay this until one of two 
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1 things happen? Actually we would like to immediately 
2 appeal it, and if the Court would consider staying it 
3 because you're forcing my client to waive rights that 
4 the statute clearly permits him to have, .and we would 
5 like to appeal that on an expedited basis. 
6 THE COURT: Well, I don't have any problem 
7 with your appeal. See if they'll take it on an 
8 interlocutory appeal. 
9 MR. BLACK: And I'm not -- because it's a 
10 summary process I think it would be an interlocutory 
11 appeal, but what I am saying is I'm asking the Court 
12 to stay its nullification of the lien that's clearly 
13 called for by statute. I understand where the Court's 
14 coming from, but I think that there is significant 
15 room to disagree with the Court's conclusion because 
16 this Court is specifically saying that the legislature 
17 didn't mean what it said when it passed the notice of 
18 interest statute. 
19 So all I'm saying is if the Court will stay 
20 that until we can appeal it, I think it would be fair 
21 for everybody. 
22 THE COURT: Mr. Carlston, do you have any 
23 objection to it? 
24 MR. CARLSTON: Well, your Honor, Mr. Black 
25 thinks through the back door he can get what he can't 
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1 get through the front door. We have a process here 
2 for approving and preparing an order which would give 
3 them plenty of time to appeal, if they wish to do so. 
4 THE COURT: Why isn't that process 
5 appropriate for your client, Mr. Black? 
6 MR. BLACK: Because if you get rid of the 
7 lien right now it is gone, and my client has lost --
8 these people are conveying property in breach of a 
9 contract that this Court has before it, and it's 
10 ignoring the contract, and this Court is saying in a 
11 society that everybody says there's too much 
12 litigation, you have to go sue to protect your 
13 interest when the legislature already said this is how 
14 you protect your interest. All I'm saying is my 
15 client has a right to protect his interest. 
16 THE COURT: File your breach of contract, 
17 file your lis pendens and serve Mr. Russell. 
18 MR. BLACK: Well, I understand that, but 
19 what I'm saying is I think we're entitled to know 
2 0 (inaudible) interest as well, and what I'm saying is 
21 with all due respect I'm just asking this Court to 
22 permit us to appeal that without you effecting the 
23 rights of the parties. 
24 THE COURT: You have the statutory right of 
25 appeal, I'm going to sign the order. 
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17 
1 MR. BLACK: And you're denying my request 
2 for a stay? 
3 THE COURT: Correct. 
4 MR. BLACK: Okay. 
5 (Hearing concluded) 
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
I, Beverly Lowe, a Notary Public in and for the 
State of Utah, do hereby certify: 
That the foregoing proceedings were transcribed 
under my direction from the electronic tape recording 
made of these proceedings. 
That this transcript is full, true, and correct 
and contains all of the evidence, all of the 
objections of Counsel and rulings of the Court and all 
matters to which the same relate which were audible 
through said tape recording. 
I further certify that I am not interested in the 
outcome thereof. 
That certain parties were not identified in the 
record, and therefore the name associated with the 
statement may not be the correct name as to the 
speaker. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this 16th day of 
March 1999. 
My commission expires: 
February 24, 20 0 0 
^ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
residing in Utah County 
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DAVID O. BLACK, #0346 
BLACK, STITH & ARGYLE, P.C. 
1245 E. Brickyard Road, Suite 350 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 484-3017 
Facsimile: (801) 484-3094 
Attorney for Respondents 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF UTAH 
LAWRENCE M. RUSSELL; 
RUSSELL/PACKARD DEVELOPMENT, 
INC.; SARATOGA SPRINGS 
DEVELOPMENT, L.C.; MERLIN SMITH 
and MARGIE SMITH, 
Petitioners, 
vs. ) 
JOHN J. THOMAS and PRP DEVELOPMENT, L.C., ) 
Respondents. 
) OBJECTION TO PETITION 
) TO CLEAR TITLE 
I Case No. 9804-4802 
) Judge: Stott 
' i 
The respondents, John J. Thomas and PRP Development, L.C., hereby object to 
Petitioners Petition to Clear Title and Memorandum in Support thereof. The Petitioners have 
requested this court enter an order voiding the Notice of Interest prior to hearing in direct 
contravention of 38-9-7 as cited by the Petitioners. 
The Petitioners also object to the sufficiency of the Petition inasmuch as a Notice of 
Claim is not a wrongful lien within the meaning of 39-1-7 (6), inasmuch as the Notice of 
Claim does not create a lien, nor is it an encumbrance upon title. The Notice of Claim is 
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nothing more than a notice to the world that respondents are entitled to trust deeds upon the 
property pursuant to agreement between the parties. In the event the court determines the 
Petition is sufficient to award a hearing, the respondents hereby request a hearing pursuant to 
39-1-7. 
DATED this Xjk day of July, 1998. 
BLAC^,^fnTH & ARGYLE, P.C. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
1 hereby certify that on t h e J ^ _ day of July, 1998, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the within and foregoing Objection to Petition to Clear Title to be delivered, via first 
class mail, postage prepaid in an envelope addressed to the following named person(s): 
Michael R. Carlston !• 
Scott Keith Wilson 
SNOW, CHR1STENSEN & MART1NEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
LA^xi,^ y J / A x ^ w / i \ 
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MICHAEL R. CARLSTON (A0577) 
SCOTT KEITH WILSON (A7347) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801)521-9000 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LAWRENCE M. RUSSELL; 
RUSSELL/PACKARD DEVELOPMENT, 
INC.; SARATOGA SPRINGS MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEVELOPMENT, L.C; MERLIN SMITH PETITION TO CLEAR TITLE 
and MARGIE SMITH, 
Petitioners, 
Case No. 9?OV- VffO <2 
vs. 
JOHN J. THOMAS and PRP , 
DEVELOPMENT, L.C, Judge <rhoJ( 
Respondents. 
INTRODUCTION 
This Petition has been filed to challenge defendants' recording of a "Notice of Claim" 
as to properties owned by or under a contract of sale to petitioners. Respondents have no 
legitimate legal claim to an interest in these properties, and no contractual or other legal right 
to file a so-called "Notice of Interest." By this petition, plaintiffs seek a ruling that the filing 
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of the Notice of Interest is a wrongful lien pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §38-9-1, and request 
an expedited hearing on this matter within ten days, and an immediate order nullifying this 
wrongful lien, as provided by Utah Code Ann. §38-9-7. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On February 21, 1994, Respondent PRP Development, L.C. (PRP)1 was 
formed in order to develop residential property. Its members were Russell/Packard 
Development, Inc., and Premier Homes, L.C, which is owned and operated by Respondent 
John Thomas. See Articles of Organization, attached as Exhibit 1. 
2. In November 1996, PRP contracted to purchase 72 townhouse lots in the 
Saratoga Springs Phase I, located in Lehi, Utah, from C.M.T. Investments, who made the sale 
on behalf of the property owners, Saratoga Springs Development, L.C. The purchase contract 
provided that the individual lots would be closed according to an established schedule. See 
Real Estate Purchase Contract, attached as Exhibit 2. 
3- On April 2, 1997, Larry Russell, on behalf of Russell/Packard, and Premier 
Homes, as the members of PRP, entered into a Purchase and Development Agreement which 
provided that Russell/Packard would sell its share of PRP to Premier for $5,000.00, and 
would acquire PRP's interest in the Purchase Contract for the 72 Saratoga Springs townhouse 
lots. See Purchase and Development Agreement, 111-2, attached as Exhibit 3. 
1
 The original name of this L.C. was Premier-Russell/Packard, L.C, but the name was 
later formally changed to PRP Development, L.C. 
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4. The Purchase and Development Agreement provided that Russell would pay a 
total of $528,000.00 for the Saratoga Springs properties, to be paid in the future as the lots 
were sold. Specifically, Russell agreed to pay to PRP $8,000.00 per lot at the time of the 
closing of each of the last of the 66 lots to be sold. Accordingly, Russell could sell the first 6 
lots in the development without making any payment to PRP. Id., \2. 
5. The Purchase and Development Agreement further provides that "the amounts 
due PRP shall be secured by a standard trust deed and trust deed note in favor of PRP to be 
recorded after the closing of the construction loan and/or an escrow arrangement at American 
Legal Title, acceptable to PRP, which arrangement provides for the payment of $8,000 to PRP 
upon the sale of each lot." Id., 12(c). Thus, the Purchase and Development agreement 
authorizes only that a trust deed for $8,000 may be recorded on properties owned by 
Russell/Packard following the closing of a construction loan. 
6. After Russell and Russell/Packard had ceased their association with PRP, PRP 
failed to meet certain of its obligations, including payments on a construction loan, payments 
for construction materials provided to PRP projects, and lease payments on a truck. 
7. Pursuant to the terms of a Letter Agreement dated March 2, 1998, Russell 
agreed to pay these debts owed by PRP. John Thomas personally, and on behalf of PRP 
Development, acknowledged such debts, and agreed that $110,173.45 would be deducted from 
the total amount to be paid to PRP under the terms of the Purchase and Development 
Agreement, and that no payments would be made to PRP until the $110,173.45 plus interest 
had been fully set off against the amounts owed by Russell under the Purchase and 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Development Agreement. If divided into $8,000 increments, this Letter Agreement thus 
provided that Russell is not obligated to make payments for the Saratoga Springs properties 
until an additional 13-14 properties in the development had been sold, depending upon the 
amount of interest accrued. In addition, the Letter Agreement provides that there is no waiver 
of possible additional claims to be made by Russell which could also require a set-off of 
additional amounts otherwise owing under the Purchase and Development Agreement2. See 
Letter Agreement, Exhibit 4. 
8. Accordingly, pursuant to the terms of the Purchase and Development 
Agreement and the Letter Agreement, no monies would be owed by Russell to PRP, and no 
payments were to be made to PRP, until after the first 19-20 lots had been finally sold to home 
buyers. 
9. On June 22, 1998, PRP recorded a "Notice of Interest" as to all but 10 of the 
72 lots, including lots which had not been closed by Russell or Russell/Packard, and other lots 
which had been sold to homeowners. This Notice of Interest states that PRP claims an 
unspecified interest in these properties pursuant to the original purchase contract which had 
been fully conveyed to Russell, and pursuant to the Purchase and Development Agreement. 
See Exhibit 5. 
10. PRP's Notice of Interest has been filed against these properties without any 
authorization or authority granted in any documyent or by any law. None of the owners of 
2Indeed, it now appears that substantial additional claims may exist. See Affidavit of 
Lawrence M. Russell, ^6. 
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properties affected by the Notice has conveyed to PRP an interest in the property. See 
Declarations of Petitioners attached as Exhibits 6 through 8. 
ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §38-9-7, petitioners are authorized to seek an order from 
this court nullifying the wrongful lien filed by Respondents in the form of a Notice of Interest. 
The statute requires that petitioners state with specificity the claim that the lien is a wrongful 
lien, and support this claim with an affidavit from the holder of an interest in the property 
subject to the wrongful lien. 
1. Respondent's "Notice of Claim" Constitutes a Wrongful Lien Pursuant to 
§38-9-1(6). 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1(6) provides as follows: 
"Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien or 
encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time it is 
recorded or filed is not: 
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal statute; 
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of competent 
jurisdiction in the state; or 
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of the 
real property.
 x 
Respondents' Notice of Claim is not purported to be based on either (a) or (b) above, 
as the Notice states, on its face, that it is based only upon "an agreement dated April 2, 1997, 
and a Uniform Real Estate Contract dated November 5, 1996, and November 8, 1996, copies 
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of which are attached" to the Notice. The "agreement" referred to is the Purchase and 
Development Agreement which is explained at 13 above, and is attached hereto as Exhibit 3. 
The "Uniform Real Estate Contract" referred to is the contract for the sale of the Saratoga 
Springs properties which is explained at \1 above, and is attached hereto as Exhibit 2. Neither 
of these documents provides any basis for Respondents to file a notice of interest in the 
Saratoga Springs properties. 
With regard to the properties owned by Saratoga Springs Development, L.C., and 
Merlin and Margie Smith, Respondents have no claim to any interest, due to the simple fact 
that the documents cited in the Notice of Claim do not in any way purport to be "signed by or 
authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of the real property," as required by 
Utah Code Ann. \ 38-9-1 (6)(c). 
With regard to those properties currently owned by Lawrence Russell and/or 
Russell/Packard, neither of the two cited documents purport to authorize Respondents to file 
their Notice of Interest. 
(a) The Uniform Real Estate Contract. Under the clear terms of the Purchase 
and Development Agreement, which Respondents also rely upon, Respondents have 
transferred all interest in the "Uniform Real Estate Contract" for the Saratoga Springs 
properties to Lawrence Russell. The Agreement provides specifically that "PRP agrees to 
assign to Russell all of its right, title and interest in the Contract and its right to acquire the 
Saratoga property," and this agreement has been fully executed. Accordingly, the sales 
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contract cannot form a legitimate basis for Respondent's claim of an interest in any of the 
properties. 
(b) The Purchase and Development Agreement. The Purchase and Development 
Agreement cannot form the basis for Respondents' claim of interest, since this document does 
not of itself constitute or purport to create an interest in property. Rather, the document 
provides for a transfer of Respondents' interests in the contract to purchase the properties. 
Although the Agreement states that sums owed to PRP may be secured by a trust deed, 
to be recorded only following the closing of a construction loan (and therefore purchase of the 
property) by Russell/Packard, such does not in any way constitute an authorization for 
Respondents to record an unspecified "claim" against the individual properties in the 
development. The Purchase and Development Agreement does not itself purport to create any 
property rights, and only constitutes an agreement that Respondent may cause a document (a 
trust deed) to be executed which would then create an interest in certain of the properties, 
under certain conditions. Respondents have not at any time caused a trust deed to be executed 
by Lawrence Russell or Russell/Packard and recorded on specific properties following the 
closing of a construction loan in order to secure amounts due and owing to PRP, and this is the 
only right which the Agreement purports to grant to PRP. 
This is an important distinction. Under the Purchase and Development Agreement, 
PRP would only have a right to have a trust deed executed when a construction loan has 
already closed on a property as to which Russell/Packard owes an $8,000 payment. The 
Agreement itself excludes the first six properties sold, and an additional 13-14 properties are to 
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be excluded pursuant to the terms of the Letter Agreement cited above, at \1. Respondents 
have excluded from their notice only ten of the Saratoga Springs properties, and there is no 
logic to this exclusion, since the Notice of Claim applies to properties not yet owned by 
Russell/Packard, and to properties which have been transferred to home buyers. Thus, it is 
apparent that the procedure set out in the Agreement is very important; PRP is only given the 
right to seek a trust deed, and such would only be executed by Russell/Packard if it is agreed 
both that there are "amounts due" under the agreement, and that a specific property should be 
subject to a trust deed under the Agreement. The Agreement does not in any way authorize 
what Respondent has done, which is to file a broad claim of an unspecified interest in nearly 
all of the Saratoga Springs Properties, regardless of whether PRP is currently owed any money 
by Russell/Packard for the properties, and regardless of the identity of the actual owners of the 
properties at the time. 
2. The Court Should Declare the Notice of Claim to Be Invalid, and Award Fees and 
Costs to Petitioner, 
Utah Code Ann. ^38-9-7(5)(a) authorizes the Court to issue an order declaring the 
wrongful lien void ab initio, releasing the property from the lien and to award costs and 
reasonable attorney's fees to the Petitioner. Petitioners request that the Court issue such an 
order, and set a hearing within ten days to resolve this issue. 
Dated this I [) day of July, 1998. 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By: a^h-yiky^ 
Klithael R. Carlston 
Scott Keith Wilson 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
N:\19J98\2\SKW\PETITION.MEM 
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 P I^^R_R U S SELL/PACKARD, L.C. 
We, the undersigned do hereby adopt the following Articles 
of Organization for the purpose of forming a Utah Limited Liabil-
ity Company, to wit: 
1. Name. The name of the Company shall be PREMIER-PJJSSELL/" 
PACKARD, L.C. 
2. Duration. The Company shall continue until terminated 
as provided in the Operating Agreement. 
3. Business Purpose. The business purpose for which the 
Company is organized is to prepare and record a final tract map 
with respect to "certain property located in Salt Lake County, 
Utah, to install required off tract and off-site street and 
utility improvements and construct and sell single family resi-
dences to the general public and to engage in any other lawful 
activity relating to the above purposes. 
4. Registered Aaent. The Company shall continuously 
maintain an agent in the State of Utah for service of process who 
is an individual residing in said state. The name and street 
address of the initial registered agent shall be J. Craig Carman, 
311 South State Street, Suite 380, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. -m\ 
•• " ACCEPTANCE OF APPOINTMENT:^?: 
J^Craig Carman •• .-•.v^Sfe:--
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The Director of the Division of Corporations and Commercial 
Code of the Department of Commerce for the State of Utah is 
appointed the registered agent of the Company for service of 
process if the registered agent has resigned, the registered 
agent's authority has been revoked, or the registered agent 
cannot be found or served with the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence. 
5. Members. The names and street addresses of the indi-
viduals ("Members") who shall constitute the initial Members of 
the Company are as follows: 
Premier Homes, L.C. 
7069 Highland Drive, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
Russell/Packard Development, Inc. 
9007 Arrow Route, Suite 280 
Rancho Cucamonga, CA 91730 
6. Management. The Company shall be managed by its Members 
pursuant to the terms of the Operating Agreement, or any amend-
ments thereto. 
7. Records. The Company shall keep at its principal place 
of business all records required to be maintained by the Company 
pursuant to Section 48-2b-119 of the Utah Code Annotated, which 
records include, but are not limited to, the following: 
7.1 A current list in alphabetical order of the names 
and last known business street addresses of each 
member. 
7.2 A copy of the stamped articles of organization and 
all certificates of amendment thereto. 
-2-
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7.3 Copies of all tax returns and financial statements 
of the Company for the past 3 years. 
8. Contributions. No member shall-be obligated to make any 
contribution to the Company except those specifically set forth 
in the Operating Agreement adopted by the Members of the Company. 
9. Dissolution. This Company shall be dissolved as provid-
ed in the Operating Agreement. 
10. Annual Report. The Company shall file all annual 
reports required by Utah law during the month of its anniversary 
date of formation as required by Section 48-2b-120, Utah Code 
Annotated. 
11. Amendments. The Articles of Organization shall be 
amended from time to time as required by Section 43-2b-121, Utah 
Code Annotated. 
12. Operating Agreement. The Members shall enter into an 
operating agreement which shall set forth additional terms and 
conditions relating to the management, operation and ownership of 
the Company. 
13. Signatures. All Members of the Company shall sign 
these Articles of Organization. 
DATED this QJ sfday of February, 1994. 
Premi 
John J. Thomas, Member c\< C*r*r : (.f-^C-
Russe l l /Packaqd Development, 
v Inc . 
Lawrence dl-t-RtrsSeTl, 
j P r e s i d e n t 
- 3 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE ARTICLES OF ORGANIZATION 
OF 
PREMIER-RUSSELL/PACKARD, L.C, 
5: -^3 
—. zi c-i 
We, the undersigned, being a l l of the members of FrejL|r-:g 
Russel l /Packard, L.C. to hereby amend our A r t i c l e s of Organza^ 
t i o n as fo l lows: 
m 
o 
rn 
m 
A. Amendment. Paragraph 1 of the Articles of Organization 
is amended in its entirety to read as follows: 
J£ajae. The name of the company shall be PH? Develop-
ment , L.C. 
B. Ratification. Except for the amendment set forth above, 
the Articles of Organization previously filed for this limited 
liability company are hereby ratified, affirmed and approved. 
Dated this of October, 1994. 
PREMIER 
Scat* of Utah 
r%. t i Oeparjr.tn* cf Conuncrc* 
DMilon c/ Carporatfonj and Canvr.trdal Cxi* 
I Strwy csrfjy &»r the fcrejolnj fc» b*-n fife* 
>fKi»cpfov<d on l h e 2 3 day ol>^Mf ",T* 
IHt2? ° ^ " °'L*11 Dlv,,ton «d nl^oy GIS7 thli CirJflcati thor-^ 
E»™}n«r 
/ & L ^ 
.DJ,fizjj#-
l*L~ 
wrence M. Russell, President 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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A £. j f) EAUHCTT MOMCY WECOFT 
Tne Buyer » N . f • \J0.l4?J&0^^ ' olfersio ourenese me Property described below and driver* 
to average, aa £gnwa( Moory Dapoai f £[*/*** . / ^ S in ma term of - SZ hg£.t^ JTity hfU uM\'j <u IK < e p a M f 
m uxuu sem mae aa,i nftu a •iiejaejM III 'III! UWw it pastiest i j all earatt. £>5S» f%3. 
> (Date) Recerved by (I 
xMUfi Phone Number / ^ ^ ^ 
1. PROPERTY: 
C*y / jg h i County C W q ^ ~ UtahV 
i i included nems unless excluded nwrein, mis sale shall induce ill fixtures pi seen*/ attached to me Ihoperty: plumbing, r>«at.ng. air-conditioning and 
venting fixtures and equipment, water heater, built-in appliances. Ilgm flxturaa and butos. bathroom fixtures, curtains and drapers and rods, window and 
ooo< screens, norm toon, window bllnda. ewnJnga, fcetsiiad toJevlaion antenna, seseilrte dishes, and system, walt-to-walt carpets, automatic garage door 
opener and transmrawts}. fencing, *eee and ehrube The tofloenng personal property tneu e*eo ba included m tut sale and conveyed under separate Bill of 
Saie wrtr warnnv«s ax a n c - ^ r * - ^ f r ^ r ^ i r r M jfr / — 
12 Excluded Itom*. The Hollowing item* ere excluded from (Ma aaJt _ _ _
—
_ _ _ _ _ ^ _ _ _ _ — 
2. PURCMA*£ P*lC£ AMO FnUMClMO. Buyer eg/see ID pay for tha Property at loHo-rc 
S Xfrtn,rr) EaraaallBOfvjyOeaaail 
S tddrang Loan: fiuyar agrees to assume and pay an existing loan n «hia approximate amount presensy parable atc 
par month including principal, mvereei (puaaiBj as % par annumL C real estate taxes. 2 prooerry insurance premium 
•na 2 mortgage msurance prernarfn. Buyer agraae B pay any trartassr and asaumpuon feat Seller 2 mat! 2 shall not ba 
re*eaaed from BaNMty on seid loan. Any not difference* between the approximate balance of the loan snow* above *na the actual 
balance A Caaaeaj anal be adjusted In 3 Cash 3 Ota* 
S Piomot H a Maw Leerc Buyer raoariaa the right to apply tor any of toe following loans under tne terms oescfbed below. 
GCcmvanoonal 3 FHA 3VA O D t a r Seller agrees to pay $ toward 
Dtacount Points and Buyer** other loan and dosing coaav to be allocated at Buyer's eacreton. 
3 'or a fixed rase loan: Amorvxed and payable over yean, interest shad not exceed H per annum, monthly principal and 
mwwi payment ahafl not exceed S _ _ _ _ _ . or 
3 Por an Adjustable P«t» fceongega (ARM). Amortized and payable over yean: mrua! interest rate shaH net exceed H par 
annum; WoeJ morrmiy principal and irtfetreal payments analt not exceed S Maximum Lrte Time mtereal rate shall not 
exceed _ % per annum. 
S Seeer F^endng: (See attached Seaar Fmanong Addendum) 
S . 
S^/^^^lia.riafF^rh-iai^^inCaaeataDi^g -
2 ^ Exwang/itew Lean AaaHcaoea. Buyer agree* to make appdcanon tor a loan specified aoove within ^0";a>enda' days (Application Data) after 
Accrptanoe. Buyer wffl have made Lean Aaa^eaaan onty whan Buyer has: \M) oomptoted. signed, and detivered to tr>t Lender the mmaJ loan appticaton and 
oocumetnroon rmamm^ by the Lender, and (a) pe<d at toen application teat as radulrad by via Lender Buyer will continue to sn>nde me Lender w.tn »ny 
addmonal documemxnon aa required by the Lender. IL e*thm aevan calendar days after receipt of written reouest from Se^e*. Buyer ta*b to provide to Seller 
wma»nevoenoty>ag Buyer haarnaoeLaaaAaaejctaeitD^ 
by providing wrtaen nchce to Buyer. The Broaerag*. upon receipt of a copy of such wrrtten notice, shall release to Seller, and Seller agrees to accept aa 
Se«e* s exciusn^ e remedy, the Eataeet Meaey Dauiefl wrthocrt the reouiremant of any further wntfeen automation from Buyer. , M 
2 2 QmEficesoii Buyer and the Pu»MrtJ rnwat Quairfy for a ban tor which appiicsBon has been made under taction 2 1 wimm /7 /nT calendar days 
(Qua«ftci*an Oata) $t+r Arc i earnca The Pruyortr a deemed quaimad H. on or before the OuaBfcctfcon Datt. the Property, m its current condraon and tor 
t.*>e Buyer i irnended ca«. has appralsad at a velue not iaaa than the Total Purchase Price. Buyer is deemed Qualified it. on or o«*ore me Ouaie^cauen Otic, 
me Lender vermea m wnang ttet Buyer haa bean approved aa of tha ve/tflc**on data 
22 QMiHceaon CavrMngency. ft Seller haa not pravioua+y vo*ded 9n» Caweawt as provided in Section 21. and either me Property or Buyer nas tarfeo to 
dual;*/ on o' belor* me »iaaV.eticn Data, erthar parly may cancel thit Corrtrad by providing wntien noccr to me otner party ««MI mree caienda' days 
sr*^ r rne Ouaa^caaoa De«a. oeNerwiee Buyer and the Pupaitj are deemed oueMfied. The Bn>aeraoa. ue©« nece»pt o* a copy o» such wrmen notice, snaft 
return to Buyer rw Umm* lioavy Dipsat wahout t>a raotiramant of any fcrew wrman auff<onzaaon of Setter 
1 CLOSINa Tms manaacnon ahal be doaed on or batom ^ f AJ4A*rL**i ^at ( Ooalng shall occur when (a) Buyer and Saltan ha»e 
sig'^ ed and de;^ered to each olher (or to tha eacrow/tit^ oompa^y^ 
and oy aopiicaofe arer and fb) ma moo*$ required to be paid under these docur*»ent*, rmrt bteo demrered to the escrow/sue company m the form o< 
carter's checs. co«aciad or clea/ad funds. SeAer a ^ 
m vrrbng Taxes and aaaeaamants tor the current y—e. rents, and mtorest on assumed aofigaaons shall ba prorated aa sat torm >n mis Section Unearned 
deposits on tonanc«a snafl be eaneJerred to Buyer at Caeataf. Pioreeona aet forw m VMS Secuon, shall be made as of -*Gto\t of Oeeing 3 date of 
ooaaeiMon Pother _ / 
4. POSSCSS>0eL 'Jreesa od e^rwiaa agreed m whtng by tha parses. Seaar snail oatfvar pnsf ti on to Buye» w,m,n e ^ / hqun after Ooaing. 
i. CONn»Hia.TTOH O* AQOlCY WSCUa«Uf«. At t h e 1 a m of eaa Caaeaet ma bating agent 1 . .Represents 
C Seller 3 Buyer, and the sefing agent ****{/ (^^f^^f^ repfeeamsj^Saf^jT&^er BuyeAf^ O Seder confirm that prior to signing this 
Cantrsct wn**n dqctoaure of the agancy rela*onshippJf was provtoed to him/r>er.n-4^fllyer's inttars <\jC ) Seller s imuaJs 
m-rmr^m. . • • — >, . »p ^ ^ p
 | f f f l m n ] f r j . f , p | | | | | t | | | || | Bj 11 ejB| 11 ej | | | f i l l fclwlmi • T III |l B11| | ll | J J f i l l ] I I l l^ 
general warranty deed, ^ee of fmanciat ericufnbranoaa aa warrarrted under Sectfontffo; fb) Setter egncea to pay tor and furnrsh Buyer at OeaJng w>m M 
current canaerd form owner's poaey of We ineurance m the amount of me Tesal Purcheee Pivor. (c) the Me poucy snail conform «im Seller's ooi^ahom 
wwr subseceons fa) and fb) above, Unless otherartaa agreed under aubeecoon 1.4. the eommrtment ahao eontorm «itn the bt»e »nsurance commitment 
provided under Secraon 7.
 t ^ 
7. SELLER OOCiOtURfS. NO tator than hlA— calendar days *m Aecaeaeaea Saner wtf de%ver to Buyer the following Se«er Disclosures (a) 
a Sexier proper corio^ecmdu t^oeure lor tr^ Pi e^arry. a 
6 aobeasuedbymetrtK insurance company choeen oy Seaar. erdudrng copree of aH documents Waled as Exceptions on me Convnnment (c) a copy of a* 
toen documents reawng » any toan now axJaang which wtf ancumaertto Pveperty aeaar Cinema, and (d)a copy o« a« leases aeecong the Praeerty not 
exp**>g prtorjoDeatoaj Seaar agreas to pay any tee cornrravwent eanoeltoeon charge %jn6m s*ibeecaon (0) 
t.GfJ^f<AlCOvma|Qp<aa^maeaejo»itoO 
referenced rfiSect^n 7 apova: and (b) 3 a^^r^s^^TecttoBuyeria^oroveiot an m p e c w ot t ^ r^  sMrT| The .napecton sne'i be p»d for by Buyer 
and shao be conductod by an indMduat /company of Buyerscho«e.Seoaregre«tofuilycooeavatowima 
vnoer Sacfton 11 end io m*m ma P upwli avaaafiit tor tie same. 
H Buyer anal he«e llljfa**** days aAar t\i n m wtach s» ravwjw ma content of Seller O«cio»wrev and. A ** *npectK>n com>ngency 
applies to ce-mtvesi end ivaluata 9 M tnapecaori of the Properly, and » oeaemune, *. m Buyers soat dracreeon. tne coment of M Seeer Disclosures 
(including me Proparty inapecoonj a accasaatat, 
12 if Buyer does not OafWar a wnttan oOfecoon to Seaar re^e^tigt Setter Oiscfoaure or the Pro 
above, mat oocumant or tapacaon wet be deemed approved or waived by Buyer. 
t3rta^n^ee^ecax>Buyarai»JSaaerahaflranaisa^^ 
be reoumsd to. reeo*«e Buyer's oOfecSona a Buyer's otaacstone ere not resonred wtmm e * a 
*
W a P n /^ t t C t " S * - t f "**'" ** mim * * * * P**1"*1' **** T n * •'"bavarega. upon racaapt of a copy of Buyer a wr«*« nouce. snail return c Buyer me 
^
r w ^
^
> i ^ w
^
f
^
^
^
^ , l , > 0
^
,
^
f ^
^
u > r
^ *
, l
^ »»v*Canwe«tar^*o^edbyBuyeT.8Vn<r»oo»ecaonrs 
***** to na»e bean aalvea However, fas weaver dees not aflbel «ieaa aama warmnejd m Seceon t l . 
raiaaiaJp^g^ia, llfS~ fa Is 
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10. SELLER'S UMTOD WAARAJf Jailer's warrant** to Buyer rwg»/d»ng me coodibon of the Pteperty - - limited to me following 
10 : rvnen untr *atrv«ni pntatMiun of «*e Pioportf to Buyer, ft ww. be broom-clean ano tree of debnt and personal b*ioogi»9S. 
10 ? S*<iar wai oe*ver poaeeaeion of rw; Putarty to Buyer wtth the plumbing, piurnoed flrtwa*. Netting. cooing. *rntilating. electrical and sprinkler 
iv%K^», «ppii«nc«i end fireplace* m working order, 
1C 3 Sailer wil deliver possession of the Property to Buyer with the roof and foundation free of leaks known to Seller. 
10 4 Sailer w4\ derive* po on of me Property to Buyer wtth any pnvue well or eepbc tank sarvmg the Property m working order and m compliance 
with sovw/rvnerrtaf regutebona: 
0^ 5 Setter «iD be reapontipie for repairing any of Better's movfog-reiaaad damage to me Property. 
10.6 At CloeJng. Seller wUl bring current ail financial obAgaiona encumbering the Property which are assumed m writing sy Buyer and wtH discharge alt 
such ooiigatona wr*en Buyer haa not to torn aw art and 
0^ 7 As of Clnewig. Setter haa no knowledge of any claim or notice of an anvlronmentel. bunding or ionm; code violation regarding the Property which 
has not been reeoived. 
11. VfJMPICA'nON Of WAJtPuUtTED AHO MCLUOCD (TEMt. Before CTawteg. Buyer may conduct a "walk-through" inspection of me Property to 
dettrmine wfwmer or not items warranted by Setter in Section 10.1.10.2. 10.3 and 10.4 ere in me warranted condition and to ver rfy items included m Section 
1 i art preeentty on me Pieperty. If any hem la not in me wo* rented condition. Setter wilt correct repair or replace rt as necessary or. with me consent of 
Buyer, escrow an amount af OooMf to provide tor auch repeir or replacement The Buyer's faiKire to conduct a *wark-mrougn" inspection, or to claim 
during me "wak-mrovgn" 'wapecbon thai the Pi up art j ooea not include aB hems referenced in Section 1.1. or is not in me condition warranted in Section 
'0. wart not conathute a warrer by Buyer of Buyer's righto under Secbon 1.1 or of the w*rranoes contained In Seeaon 10. 
12 -O lAJ taU0U* ia i f lT lU l l lACT 
aitert&ons or ^provomona to me Property shall be made or vrndertaken without the wrmen corteent of me Buyer. 
13. AUTHORITY Of DCMEHS. If Buyer or Sewer m a corporation, partnersh*). trust, estate or omer entity, me person eiacubng this Conrad on its benaff 
warrants his or her authority to do ao and to bind Buyer or Setter. 
u . COMPLETE COemiACT. This lruarumwnt togemer wtm ita addenda, any attached exhibits, and Seller Disclosures constitute me entire Contract 
betwaan v * par*** and supersod— and repieeea any and afl prior rwootesoro. represwnucaOfW. wa/ranbes. understanding* or contract* between the 
partres. Thit Caetmit cannot be changed except by wrftkan agreement of the pa/bee. 
IS. DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The p*/*ea agree met arty dispute or daim rotating to f h * Contract including but not limned to me disposition of me Earnest 
Money Dipsetl lha breach or termination of ttie Cwnai t. or me services relating to this traneeeaon. shad first be submroed to mediation in accordance 
wrth the Utah Reel Estate Buyer/Setter Medtaoon ftuiea of the Amertcan Arbitration Association. Disputes snail tnchjde representations made by me 
C* rt>e* »Ay Broker or crmer person or erw^ In con 
pertains, including wrthout llmnvfleA aJteoaflone of concoaamont rwaiepreaentabon, negligence and/ or fraud Each party agrees to bear its own costs of 
mediation. Any agreement signed by the parses pursuant to the medlaaon aftaJI be binding if meombon %•*. the procedures applicable and remedies 
available under this Contract ehajl apply. Nothing in mm Secton 15 aneJ prohibit any party from seeking emergency equitable relief pending mediation. By 
marking mrs box O . and aotfng their inrfeers, the Buyer ( ),andmeSe4er( J, agree mat mediation under m«s Seoon 15 is not mandatory, but is 
optional upon agreement of all pe/bea. 
H . Of FAULT, ff Buyer deeauHa. Setter may etectto either netom the larweet aieney Oepwait es iiquttfeted damages or to return me Earnest Money Oopee* 
ane sue Buyer» eriforca SeMe/a n^nss. ff Seeejr o^ ewMJls« in addrtto^ 
iiquioated damages, a turn equal to me Earnest feeney DepeeJL or to sue Saner tor apecmc peftormanee and/or damages R Buyer elects to accept the 
liquidated damages. Setter agree* to pey the liquidated damage* to Buyer upon demand Where a Section of this Contract provrpes a apecmc remedy ma 
parties intend mat me remedy eneJt be exctuarve ragarrflaea of rtghto which might otherwise be available unoer common law. 
17. AnOftMETS FEES. >n any acbon artamg out of met Contract the prevailing party shad be erttfled to coss and reasonable attorney's fees 
11. DtSPOSmOM Of EAAMEST MOMEY. The Eameet Mwney 0 tonal shaft not be reieaaed unlets it >s aumonzed by: (a) Section 2. Section 6 3 or Section 
IS: ft) seoarast wrtatn ag/eement of me perbes. or (d court order. 
11. AtKOCAT)0»t Except for expreas warrarrbet maoe m ttta Canaract, the pro»ieioris of mrs Contract snail no*, appry iter Qoamg 
20. ASX Of LOSS. Ail nek of loaa or damage to me Property shaJ be borne by Setter until Qoetng. 
2t. H U E rs Of THE S O O f C g . Time is of the eaaenca regarding me dels* set form m mrs transacbon Extensions must be agreed to w> wncng by an parties 
b«r*ormance under aacn Seceon of mrs Ceieln.1 wrecfi refeiencea a dtto anail be required absolutely by S.-00 PU Mountain Time on the statad arte 
21. FAC3IMTLE (f AJQ DOCUMENTS. Feceurale transmtaaion of any ttgned onginai oocument, anq retransmission of any signed facsimile transmission, 
snail be the same as delivery of an ongmet. H the tranaacbon Irtvorvea muibpie Buyenj or Set wrs. hjcs<mite transmissions may be executed in counterparts 
23. ACCEPTAIfCS. Axcepianue occvra when Seller or Buyer, responding to an offer or counteroffer of me other (a) s*gns :ne offer or counter wher t noted 
to indicate azcepancr. and (b) comrnvncaees to me other party or me other party's agent mat me oner or counteroffer has been signed as required. 
2^0FFER AWO TIME FOPJ ACCCPTAMOL Buyer offers to purenaae me Property on me above terms and condioors K Sei»er does not accept trus offer &y 
. mrs offer shall Upsa; and the Brocerage shaU return me Eameet Money 
{Buyers Sgnatirej (/&r**uSlj*<\j*~*±£CS'(Offer Oen) (Buyer's Sgnature) 
T^above data enail be me Owar Reference D< 
(One/Data) 
Oe«e. 
(Nobce Aooresal (Phone) (Nobce Addreee) (Phone) 
^ ^ A C C ^ r n A M C E / R a U K T I O M / C O U K r r C R O f F E U 
C H K X ^ O ^ t 
^Aoeep4arica fi Owar to) Pia ufuaia. Seuer l u a p t a me fxpgotng ofsar on the bjrrn* and oonditrons specified above. g^ jMf e^OwartoPyreiiojwrSwite/ IccapH 
IH2L_ k^ 
(SeiwrsSigyvaaW \ (Oejaf 
(Oasat (Time) (SeAer's Signature) (Data) (Time) 
me term* of Buyer's ofler abject to the execpuona or rnodiBcabont as specrhed m me attached 
^»L^HKjutnwBroe*rtofurnie*B^ (One of me toilow^g ahemehves must mefetore 
) C o i n e d bear receipt of a SrtoJ copy of me tonagotng rtm^t ha tng a# Mc/iasuree; 
. \ \ ssoMATuec Of B U T W 
BaipenwwJycauatda faWcopycJt r^ _ ^ _ . t« by 
oeraeed Mai and raaum nsceejt ttoached hereto to me Q Sewer. O Buyer, Sere by . I retoa>  D J e M . D B u y e r , en* y TX?£* ^ 
^ '°-
J¥^— i^i-JgJptLiiJcJs.* 
* tv t»ai inaw eaai asmrit ocevjaeawM mm twa o>wci or TWX UT*M snceaci rnamat. AWX. was 
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ADDENDUM #1 
TO 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
By reference, this is an ADDENDUM to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC") with an 
Offer Reference Date of August 14, 1996, including all addenda and counter offers, between P.R.P Development, 
Inc., as Buyer and ( i .U .T Wgsnifrra* ., as Seller on property known as: "Saratoga 
Springs No. 1" Subdivision, Lehi^Iity, UT. (72 fully improved town home building lots). 
The following terms are hereby incofporatod as pan of the REPC, and to the extent these terms modify or conflia 
with any provisions of the REPC, these terms shall control All other terms of the REPC not modified shall remain 
the same: 
1. Buyer to cloee on any 9 lots within 30 days from time that a building permit can be obtained from 
pertinent city and all improvements are installed including but not limited to pavement. 
2. Buyer to does on any 9 lots every 90 days thereafter until all lots are closed 
3. At dosing Buyer will close 9 lots X $30,000.00 * $270,000.00. This will release nine (9) lots. 
4. Seller's release of lots will be determined at Buyer and Seller's discretion, prior to closing 
5. No let to be dosed on prior to any and all improvements being installed, including pavement and a 
building permit being obtainable from pertinent city. 
6. All construction debris on all lots to be removed by Seller prior to closing on each lot. 
7. Seller to approve Buyer's site plan, architectural plan, elevations and exterior materials. Buyer 
understands that be will be responsible for all costs related to any changes to she plan if changes are 
required to fit Buyer's home pians. 
NOTE: Some principals, managers anchor employees of buyer are licensed real estaie agents or brokers 
with the State of Utah. 
( ) Buyer ( X ) Seller shall have until 5:00 ( ) am ( X ) PM Mountain Time, November 8, 1996 to accept these 
terms. Unless so accepted, this offer shall lapse. 
ACCEPTANCE / REJECTION / COUNTER OFFER 
(-0 Seller ( ) Buyer hereby accepts these terms. 
„ . X \ jikk* — 
( ) Buyer v_ (/) Seller Signature D a S * 
( ) Rejection: ( ) SeDer ( ) Buyer rejects these terms. 
(Initials) (Date) 
( ) CouxterOffcr. ( ) Seller ( ) B19W presents as a counter offer the terms set forth on the attached Counter 
Offer* 
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PRP DEVELOPMENT, LC. 
7069 HIGHLAND DRIVE 3-94 
SALT LAKE CITY. UT 84121-3701 
(801)944-9191 
Fn) v/-t^^r^Ov^S^^^ *S* /[ 
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V 
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"•OOOI.7&II- i: 121.000 7 3 ?i: i*U0 5e00 5i*5 50n' 
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PURCHASE AND DEVELOPMEiNT AGREEMENT 
0 This Purchase and Development Agreement ("Agreement") is made and entered into this 
3^ day of April, 1997 by and between PRP Development, LC ("PRP"), a Utah Limited Liability 
Company, Russell-Packard Development, Inc. ("RPI"), a California Corporation, Premier Homes 
Construction, LC. ("Premier"), a Utah Corporation and Lawrence M. Russell ("Russell"). 
Premier Homes, LC and Premier Homes Construction, LC are two separate entities. 
RECITALS 
WHEREAS, Russell and Premier Homes, LC are the sole members of PRP, and 
WHEREAS, Russell desires to sell all of his right, title and interest in PRP to Premier on 
the terms and conditions set forth herein, and 
WHEREAS, Russell desires the right to acquire from PRP Lots 1 to 72 in the Saratoga 
Springs Subdivision, Phase 1 located in Utah County, Utah (said lots are hereinafter collectively 
referred to the "Saratoga Property"and the individual lots are referred to as the "Lots") pursuant 
to the terms of a real estate purchase contract ("Contract") signed by PRP on November 5,1996 
and signed by CMT Investments as Seller on November 8,1996 which Contract names PRP as 
Buyer, and 
WHEREAS, Russell is willing to pay PRP to acquire said Property. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the covenants and promises set forth herein, the 
parties murually agree as follows: 
1. Purchase of Interest in PRP. Premier agrees to pay and Russell agrees to accept the sum 
of S5,000 for Russell's remaining interest in PRP. Russell shall transfer it's interest in PRP 
to Premier at the time of closing. Premier shall pay Russell the purchase price at the time 
of closing. The parties represent that the purchase prices set forth herein represents a fair 
estimate of the value of Russell's remaining interest in PRP as of the date hereof. 
2. Saratoga Property. PRP agrees to assign to Russell all of its right, title and interest in the 
Contract and its right to acquire the Saratoga Property at the time of closing. Russell 
agrees to ray PRP the sum of $528,000 for PRP's interest in the Saratoga Property. Said 
sum shall be paid as follows: 
a. Russell shall pay PRP the sum of 58,000 for each Lot on 66 Lots of the Saratoga 
Property. In such an event, Russell shall be entitled to sell the first 6 lots without 
making any payment to PRP. On the last 66 lots, Russell shall pay PRP the sum of 
1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
$8,000 at the time of closing of the sale of each Lot. No interest shall accrue on 
the unpaid balance. 
b. In the event Russell sells, assigns or transfers the Saratoga Property other than 
through the sale of an individual Lot, the amounts due PRP shall become due and 
payable upon such in such event. 
c. The amounts due PRP shall be secured by a standard trust deed and trust deed 
note in favor of PRP to be recorded after the closing of the construction loan 
and/or an escrow arrangment at American Legal Title, acceptable to PRP, which 
arrangment provides for the payment of 58,000 to PRP upon the sale of each Lot. 
d. Russell shall have until April 1,1999 to pay the principal sum of S528,000 at no 
interest. Interest shall accrue after April 1,1999 at the rate of 8 percent per annum 
on the unpaid principal balance. After April 1,2000, the principal sum, together 
with all accrued interest, shall become due and payable 
3. Disclaimer of Interest. As a material part of the consideration of this Agreement, Russell 
and RPI acknowledge and agree that upon the consummation of the transaction set forth 
in this Agreement, neither Russell nor RPI shall have any further interest in and to PRP or 
any of its assets, projects or properties. 
4. Notice. All demands and notices to be given hereunder, if any, shall be personally 
delivered or sent by registered mail addressed to the respective parties at their postal 
addresses as of the date of this Agreement or to such other address as each may hereafter 
designate in writing. 
5. Successors. Except as otherwise provided herein, this Agreement shall be binding upon 
and inure to the benefit of the respective parties hereto, their legal representatives, 
successors and assigns. 
6. Entire Agreement. This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement and understanding 
between the parties hereto and supersedes all prior agreements or understandings. 
7. Amendment. This Agreement may not be altered or amended except by a subsequent 
written agreement executed by all of the parties hereto. 
8. Attorney's fees. In the event of any controversy or claim or dispute between the parties 
hereto arising out of or relating to this Agreement or any of the documents provided for 
herein, or the breach thereof, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover from the 
losing party reasonable attorneys1 fees, expenses and costs, whether incurred prior to, 
during or subsequent to trial including appeals. 
2 
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Additional Documents. The parties hereto agree to execute such additional documents as 
may be necessary or desirable to cany out the intent of this Agreement. 
Nonwaiver. The failure of any party to enforce the provisions of this Agreement shall not 
constitute a waiver unless specifically stated in writing, signed by the party whose rights 
are deemed waived, regardless of a party's knowledge of a breach hereunder. 
Governing Law. The terms of the Agreement shall be governed by and construed in 
accordance with Utah law. The parties agree that any legal proceedings relating to the 
subject matter of this Agreement shall be brought exclusively in the Stae of Utah. The 
parties represent to each other that the Agreement to bring legal proceedings exclusively 
in the State of Utah will not place a serious inconvenience or be unfair or unreasonable to 
any of the parties hereto. Because the State of Utah has a substantial relationship to both 
the parties and this transaction, it is appropriate to select the Utah Courts to handle any 
and all legal proceedings relating hereto. 
Severability. If any of the terms and conditions of this Agreement shall be declared invalid 
by a court, agency, commission or other tribunal or entity having jurisdiction thereof, the 
application of such provisions to parties or circumstances other than those as to which it is 
held invalid or unenforceable shall not be affected therebv, and each of them not so 
declared invalid or unenforceable shall be valid and be enforced to the fullest extent 
permitted by law and the rights and obligations of the parties shall be reasonable terms 
consistent with the undertakings of the parties under this Agreement has been substituted 
in place of the invalid provision. 
Paragraph Headings. Paragraph headings in this Agreement are for convenience only and 
shall not be deemed to modify, interpret or limit the provisions hereof. 
Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of 
which shall be deemed an original, but all of which together shall be deemed to be one and 
the same instrument. 
Time of the Essence. Time is of the essence in this Agreement. 
Authorization. The individuals who have signed this Agreement represent and warrant 
that they are duly authorized to execute this Agreement, in either their individual or 
representative capacity as indicated, and that this Agreement is enforceable according to 
its terms. 
Survival. The provisions, promises, warranties, representations, and covenants set forth 
herein shall survive any execution, settlement, delivery or recording of any instrument and 
shall not be merged therein. 
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18. Legal Counsel. The parties hereto have engaged the law firm of Carman & Associates, 
P.C. to prepare this Agreement. All parties acknowledge that they have been advised to 
seek independent legal advice to represent their individual interests to the extent they 
deem it necessary. 
19. Costs. Each of the parties shall pay their own costs and expenses incurred, or to be 
incurred, in negotiating and preparing this Agreement and in closing and carrying out the 
transactions contemplated by this Agreement. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have executed this Agreement on the day and year 
above written. 
PRP Development, LC 
fistv 
m mber 1ty^ify^ffi/cJ^iM&Hm4s/U 
Russell-PackdrcJ/Oevelopment, Inc. 
Premier Homes Construction, LC 
~M0Sk?&z> 
vrence M. Russell 
4 
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LAW OFFICES 
S N O W , C H R I S T E N S E N & M A R T I N E A U 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
10 EXCHANGE PLACE, ELEVENTH FLOOR 
POST OFFICE BOX 45000 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145-5000 
TELEPHONE (801) 521-9000 
FACSIMILE (801) 36J-0400 
. writer's dircci number: 
Scott Keith Wilson / ^ ^ . (80i)322-7ii5 
March 2, 1998 
J. Craig Carman 
311 South State Street, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: Burton Lumber v. PRP, et al. 
Dear Craig: 
As we discussed yesterday, I am writing to set out the terms of our proposed settlement 
of the lawsuit filed against PRP Development (PRP), John Thomas, and Larry Russell by 
Burton Lumber, which arises out of PRP's unpaid account with Burton Lumber, which now 
totals $90,009.00. As you know, the amounts owed to Burton Lumber are the debts of PRP, 
and any payments made by Larry Russell in order to settle this account must be set off against 
amounts payable to PRP under the terms of the Purchase and Development Agreement 
executed on April 2, 1987. Although we understand that PRP and John Thomas dispute some 
of the charges claimed by Burton Lumber, the total of these disputed amounts is less than 
$11,000. Thus, even under PRP's view of the debt, the amount owed is still at least 
$79,009.00. 
In addition to the Burton Lumber account, Larry Russell has also paid off certain other 
debts owed by PRP. These obligations include $12,364.45, arising out of Larry's payoff of 
the construction loan for Lot 15, Lake Park Meadows, and $18,800 in lease payments and 
mileage penalties arising out of PRP's lease of a 1996 GMC truck. 
In light of these listed obligations of PRP and its principals, Larry Russell is willing to 
resolve the current litigation with Burton Lumber, provided that these PRP obligations thereby 
satisfied are deducted from amounts payable to PRP under the terms of the Purchase and 
Development Agreement. These amounts are as follows: 
$79,009.00 Burton Lumber 
12,364.45 Lot 15, Lake Park Meadows 
18.800.00 GMC truck lease 
$110,173.45 Total 
Larry Russell will be solely responsible for all other lease obligations related to the 1996 
GMC truck. 
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J. Craig Carman 
March 2, 1998 
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Accordingly, $110,173.45 will be deducted from the total amount to be paid to PRP under the 
terms of the Purchase and Development Agreement, and no payments will be made to PRP 
until the $110,173.45 plus interest at the rate of 8 percent per annum has been fully set off 
against the $8,000.00 payments specified by the Purchase and Development Agreement. In 
addition, Larry Russell will retain ownership of the GMC truck. The settlement as stated in 
this letter resolves only those three debts listed above, and does not waive or affect any other 
claims which have arisen or which may arise between Larry Russell and John Thomas, PRP, 
its present principals or others. This agreement is conditioned on Larry Russell's complete 
settlement of the Burton Lumber litigation and complete release of Larry Russell, John 
Thomas, and PRP from said lawsuit. 
There is currently a limited window of opportunity for Larry Russell to settle the Burton 
Lumber case on PRP's behalf, and so this offer will remain open only until close of business 
on Monday, March 2, 1998. 
If this agreement is acceptable to you and your clients, please execute this agreement by 
signing below as indicated and returning it to me. If you have any questions, please call. 
Very truly yours, 
SN£W, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Michael R. Carlston 
Scott Keith Wilson 
Counsel for Lawrence M. Russell 
APPROVED AND ACCEPTED: 
John J. Thomas, personally and 
on behalf of PRP Development, LC 
A 
J. Craig Carman 
Counsel for John J. Thomas and PRP 
N:\19598U\SKW\CARM AN2.LTR 
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NOTICE OF INTEREST 
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NOTICE OF INTEREST it hereby given ihat PRP Development, L.C., a Ut*h limited 
liability company, purauam to an agreement dated April 2. 1997. and a Uniform Real Elate 
Contract dated November 5.1996 and November 8, 1996, copiw of each of which are 
attached hereto a* Exhibit "A*, claims an Inierwt in and to lots 1 .2 , 3, 4. 5, 6. H. 9. II. 
13. 14. 15. 16, 17. 1$. 19, 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31, 32. 33, 34. 35. 
36, 37. 31, 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 4S. 46. 47. 48. 49. SO. SI, 52. 53. 4\54. 5fr. 57. 5S, 
it). Ai). 61. 62. 67. 69. 70 ,71 . of Saratoga Springs Plat A, Plat 4. Sheet 2.'Wanned Unit 
Development located in Utah County, Sate of Utah. 
DATED this J l _ day of June, 199*. 
.NT. i.e. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
; s s . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
John Thomas 
On thit If day of June. 1998, Wore me the undersigned, a Notary Puhlie In 
ucd fur ir.,d County und .Suite, pi*: sunnily appeared John Tlwtn.ii. known to mc ici lie the 
Minnjcr of PRi* Development. L t'„ end acknowledged to me that In? executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF. I have hereunto set my hand and seal tlte day and year 
firn above written. 
a p N»ury Public far Huh J&x- * 
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"•; PURCHASE AM) DEVELOPMENT AGU££MItfT 
"- (: 
»4C T^ 5 Puichai* and Drvdopaai AgmmerU rAgrctmcat") b &U lad entered into this 
#?._ d*y Qf April I W by AA4 bttu*ea PRJ Development, LC f P R P l a Utah Limited Liability 
Cwjpmy, RuestU-Packar d Development, be. fR?Di i California Cafcat ia i Premier Bonus 
CottuwdQ^ LC. rPttmler), i Utah Cotpoptt'ofi a d U*rtoet NK R M ' f ' f t u j i e i n . 
Prtmie Homo, LC u d Prtmiir Kottei CoAsfeuetioo, LC i n two aepanfc cotitlci. 
• «CtTAL$ 
WHERBAS, Rusull and Prtakf Homes. LC u* the sole ncirbon of PW\ ind 
WHERE AS, Ruueit desire* ic sell ill o/ks right, title *M interest in PR? to Premier on 
6 e temu aad conditions set ferth herein. Afld 
WH£R£A5, Russell desbts i k right to acquire ton PR? Lou I to ?2 in the S i w p 
Sprinp Subdivision, Phase I located ft Uuh Connty, Utah (said bis art hereinafter collccdvdy 
rtferctd to the u t o a p Propcny^arid the Individual leu v t nfrrred io as the -lots") pursuant j 
to the tarns of e real aetata purehaw eontnet (uCof\lraci1') signed by PAP on November 5.1996 
and lignad by CMT Investments is Seller ©o November i. 1996 which Contract nanus PRP as 
Buyer, and 
VHEREAS, Rvssell b wiilinj to pay PR? ia acquis said Property-
NOW. THEREFORE, in considtntioQ ofthe covenants and promises m forth henin. ike 
parties mutually agree * follows: 
I< >urrhai# af twe^f |w »qp Premier agrees la pa* and Ruiwll agrees to accept \h< IUIO 
of J 5,000 for Russell's remaining fait rest in PRP. Russell shall transfer tfi interest in PRP 
to Premier at the tme of closing Premier shall pay Russell the purchase price at the time 
of elajfaj. TTie partlea reptesc&t that ifac purchase prices Ml / tab keira reprefenU a fair 
estimate of (he value of Rusaeirs remain!nj imet«t ;n PR? as of the dste hereof. 
1 S|fitenhaatffi> PR? i g m s to usigp io Rweli id of iu rithu litfe and Interest in the 
Contract and its righx to acquire die Saratoga Propcny at the time pfdoiinf. Russell 
agrees to pay PRP the sum of J53I.OOO for PHP's iruncn in the Saratoga Property. Said 
w n shall he paid ag foil*** 
a. Rueaoll shall pay PRP the sura of Jl,000 for ejeh laoa&i Lou of d* Sanioga 
Proptrry. to such IA a^enu Ruoiell ihall be entitlii to Mil the fim 6 toU wtihous 
making any payment to PR? On the last 66 lou. Russell ahaH pay PR? the sum of 
31 
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Ji^OOCutbiuincofcJost^ 
the unpaid Wnnte. 
b. b thct^ iRucaeUMn^us lgAsortr iMfo 
thfoufh the safeofan iadWdual Ut , (he aoountt d a a ? ! * shall become due and 
ptyibk upo& meh la such evtst 
e. T h e » i o u T O d u * ? W s h a n b e i e c w d b y a s t a n ^ 
n o * h bvor of PR? to be recorded after tbi elou'ng of At coosauetlon loan 
aad/ar an escrow anaAgmtnt fit American legal Title, acceptable to PRP, which 
HTMgmcnt provides for the payment of 53,000 to PR? upon the u k Of each Lou 
d. Russell shall hava until April 1.1999 to pay the principal lum of SS21,000 at no 
bucic*. Irterast shall accrue aftar April 1,1999 at the rate of 8 pt/cent p*t annum 
o*thi unpaid principal balance. AAer April 1.2000, the principal sum, together 
w{\h all accrued interest, dull become due mU poytbla 
3. pftf^)a;w^6ffn^{j[{. A* a materia! pan of the cansldor^tion of this Asrecmru, Ruuill 
and RPJ acknowledge and MTTC that apoa the consummation of the transition set forth 
in this Agroenxtti, neither RuiMll aor RP1 thai) have any funhcr imaest in and to PRP or 
any of ica assets, projects or properties. 
4. Madgg- All demands aod notices to be given hereunder, if any, shall be personally 
delivered or sew by reflttnd null ti4mn& to the respective ponies at their postal 
eddrcseas M of vhe date of this Afrtc^nt or to cuch tfhar addrett « each may hmaftsr 
designate la urlifnj. 
3. S u r e t y * Excepi at othmMK pr«n idid hereto, this Agreement shall be binding upon 
and inure to the benefit of the respective parti* haeio. their legal representatives. 
succtiion and assitns. 
6. gtwlfr ^BTr>mrnf This Ag rccmeni cooitituici the entire ajretoeat ind undersLMdiftf 
between the ponies birtco and supersedes all prior agreements or understanding f. 
7. Amtw^fsf . This Agreement may noi be iliered or s/nendtd cttipi by i subsequent 
H-urrn agreement cxccuiid br all of (he parties hcietc 
I. At i f l^v^Fgq. \n the e^ent of any controversy or claim or dispute between the panics 
hereto arising out of or relating to this Agreement w my of Uvt documents provided for 
hereto, or the breach thereof, the prcvaflni pony shall be tatitled to recover from ihe 
Ming ptny reasonable aiwicyf1 free, nqpeuas and eesii, wither locvmd priur lu. 
during or cubequcnt to trial including appals. 
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9. AiMitirtmi flftflimrrito Tie part* b e t * apt i to aceuu such tddtdoui documents u 
say be r*cmviry er desirable 10 carry dui At Inwtfoflhii/VffwntaL 
10. NPO^iiiar. T h c f f t i i o M o f ^ M t y t o n t a 
eootiliuur a **ivir uolaai «pt&j6elly staled in writing, sipud by ihf pa*Ty ufao* rifhta 
arc deemed wiivod, rvgaxdfess of i pair's bUMrddfC of a breach taiuflde/. 
It. gyftrriJrx;jnt> Ttelerntfof(bcA?ecM(>WIfe^ 
tuoedanc* wfih Utah low. The partial ft£tt A * * y kf11 proceed*** relating to fho 
jutyeet macer of ihb Agreement ffcaU bo b&jfebc eaeteivcly \n the State of Uah. The 
ponies ttpcJcte 10 tad* other thai (J* Affolsam to bring legal p^ctfdinp exduslvely 
IA tin Siatc orUlih will not pfeei a itdoiii fowavwlinci or be unfair or unrcaiooaMa to 
any of the parud hereto. Because the Sttie of Utah hoi a substantial ftiationihip to both 
tht parties and this tanuedon, if b appropriate K> sejen ch» Utah Courts to handle any 
a*l | | | legal proceedings relating hart*. 
I I SovgnMHrv. I f u y of Ac trnni and condliloas of ch/i A&reera«Gt jhail bt drfcls/ed invalid 
fay a court, ag e«*y. commission or other tribunal or intiiy having jurisdcifen ihrreoC 0 » 
tppJkddoa of Jtidi provisions to panii* or cireumftMCtt other ihan dio*e is to ttftjeh li Ii 
held inveicd or unenforceable shall not hi affected thereby, and tach of ihetn /iot so 
declared Invalid or unenforceable stall be voJfrf o^ d b* enforced io the fUlcsi cstent 
ponnirud by law and ihc rights And obligation of the parties shall be reasonable term* 
comiiteni »i(h the undertakings of Ihe parties under this Agreement ha/ ^ « wbiiituted 
In piict of the Invalid pravisloo. 
13. Earawish Hg^tprc Panfrdph headings in ih/s Agreemcot arc for cwenie&ee only and 
(hall not bodttned to modMy. toietpfti or Unit ^ provisions hcrrof. 
14. royft^f^fl^ This Aztttmm mv bo executed in in>%number of soum#rparu. aaoh of 
which shall bo doomed an wif tnal, but all of which lojether shall be rfetroed to be oni b%i 
ih« same tnuxvmtm. 
15. Tim* 9f(,k^ g a t ^ ^ TliD«UofUbfiiiJfU«lAtbii A|re«mrni. 
l i . AinKnnM(jfln Tht indivlduais who bavt l ip id ihii AfrtOflMnircpftsent an4 ^VTam 
thuiho^ i n duiy authoriatd GO Mootat this Af rttmint, In either tht ir Individual or 
rt prcienutjve capacity AS iadkaiid, iod ihai AJi Agree mem n tnforeeahie Keordlof to 
Its icons. 
17. StfY'yl I V provlsicns, promi^i. wan^nilct, trpr^scnuikrii. And CON t ft an IJ $g( forth 
htrtto ihall lUfvfvr my cicruiion sculcmcai dwliu-ry o: rcioidinf of an?- Init^ umrnt a^ d 
shall not b# mcrrtd th^rtin 
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1 Altl«ta»B^««ariaiftaiXmn8B«ino,MO.MLnuMkicliiMBlritl9)i0u 
1 l^'iM«Btfte«IUtecknBlad«&^rtMkiki>i4wN«,pMrkttl«iiiyt 
l m i i i t y i M i < | w W w l < i i » i ' i i i * k ^ i « r i l d i w M 4 ? i > w w w i 
taMa*pcrritMa|*uiMtfitM|BlMK«* 
4 MaaMMNl^MtltotoWnawWWUBtfpfeucbuMwiirttai. 
Mlq«r(*) hfihll>WJtt)):» ()*(X)IMMWUMUTim.K»m»i 1.1W w»CH?tNtu 
ACCSTMCtiRkiuMMf COWTUOfTW 
1 
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